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Abstract
The occurrence of perceived reversed motion while observers view a periodic, continuously moving stimulus (the “continuous Wagon
Wheel Illusion”) has been taken as evidence that some aspects of motion perception rely on discrete sampling of visual information. The
spatial extent of this sampling is currently under debate. When two separate motion stimuli are viewed simultaneously, the illusion of
reversed motion rarely occurs for both objects together: this rules out global sampling of the visual Weld. The same result holds when the
objects are superimposed by transparency: this argues against location-based sampling. Here we show that the sampling is in fact object-
based: we use a rotating ring stimulus split in two halves. When the two halves move in opposite directions, appearing to belong to sepa-
rate objects, perceptual reversals occur in either half at a time, but rarely in both. When the two halves physically move in compatible
directions, they generally appear to reverse simultaneously: the illusion keeps the perceptual object united. Rather than the local low-level
properties of the motion stimulus (which are comparable in both cases), it is thus the high-level organization of the scene that determines
the extent of perceived motion reversals. These results imply that the continuous Wagon Wheel Illusion, and any discrete perceptual
sampling that may cause it, is restricted to the object of our attention.
© 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction Koch, 2003). Recently, the spatial extent of this samplingIn movies or on TV, the wheels of a passing car some-
times appear to rotate in the “wrong” direction. This so-
called “Wagon Wheel” eVect is simply due to the discrete
nature of video frames. Surprisingly, a similar eVect can be
observed in real life, under continuous conditions of illumi-
nation (Schouten, 1967; Purves, Paydarfar, & Andrews,
1996) –although there are important diVerences between
the two phenomena (Pakarian & Yasamy, 2003; Kline,
Holcombe, & Eagleman, 2004). This bistable eVect, the
“continuous Wagon Wheel Illusion” has been taken as evi-
dence that some aspects of motion perception rely on dis-
crete sampling of visual information (Purves et al., 1996;
VanRullen, Reddy, & Koch, 2005, 2006; Simpson, Shahani,
& Manahilov, 2005; Andrews & Purves, 2005; VanRullen &
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Lopez-Calderon, & Aboitiz, 2006; Kline, Holcombe, &
Eagleman, 2006). When two separate, periodic motion
stimuli are viewed simultaneously, the illusion of reversed
motion rarely occurs for both objects together: this obser-
vation rules out global sampling of the visual Weld (Kline
et al., 2004). The same result holds when two independently
moving objects (e.g., a rotating fan and an expanding pat-
tern) are superimposed by transparency: this argues against
location-based sampling (Kline et al., 2006). Here we report
clear evidence that the illusion is in fact object-based: it
aVects two separate locations in alternation when they are
perceived as separate objects, but simultaneously when they
are perceived as a single object.
2. Methods
Seven subjects, including the author, participated in the main experi-
ment (Fig. 1), and 5 of these (including the author) also performed the
4092 R. VanRullen / Vision Research 46 (2006) 4091–4095control experiment (Fig. 2). All subjects provided informed consent prior
to the experiments, which were run according to local ethical guidelines.
The subjects were seated in the dark, approximately 60 cm away from a
computer screen with a refresh rate of 100 Hz. Given the limited temporal
frequency of our stimuli, this refresh rate was suYciently fast to avoid any
spurious temporal aliasing that may have contaminated our results ( Burr,
Ross, & Morrone, 1986; VanRullen et al., 2005).
Our stimulus was a bissected ring (7° diameter and 1° width), within
which a radial grating (spatial frequency 1 cycle per degree) was rotated at
a temporal frequency of 10 Hz, the optimal frequency to generate the c-
WWI (VanRullen et al., 2005; Simpson et al., 2005). A vertical gray bar
(width 1.5°) was superimposed on the screen, hiding the midline of the ring
stimulus. For the control experiment, a horizontal bar was hiding the hori-
zontal midline. Observers Wxated a small dot in the middle of the bar. At
the beginning of each trial, we (pseudo-) randomly decided on the rotation
direction (clockwise or counterclockwise) for each half of the ring stimulus
independently. Therefore, half of the trials had the two half-rings moving
in compatible directions (“congruent rotation” trials) and the rest of the
trials had the half-rings moving in opposite directions (“incongruent rota-
tion” trials). The two main stimulus conditions can be viewed online at
http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~ruWn/ringmovies/.
To measure the occurrence of illusory motion reversals during each 40s
trial (16 trials per condition, randomly interleaved), we instructed the sub-
jects to press the left arrow key whenever the left half-ring appeared to
reverse, and to keep it pressed for the entire duration of the reversal; simi-
larly, they were told to press the right arrow key when the right half-ring
reversed; no key was pressed when no illusion was present, and both keys
were pressed when the two half-rings reversed as one. In the control exper-
iment, the up and down arrows replaced the left and right arrow keys. As
for other bistable eVects, we evaluated the strength of the c-WWI as the
percentage of the time spent reporting reversed motion (Kline et al., 2004;
VanRullen et al., 2005). Even though this “classic” procedure of subjective
self-paced report can be sometimes prone to response biases (Mamassian
& Goutcher, 2005), it was deemed more suitable for our particular stimu-
lus conditions in which two bistable objects (i.e., the two half-rings) had to
be monitored simultaneously. Note that in another study we have pro-
posed a more objective way of assessing the strength of the c-WWI, based
on unbalanced counterphase gratings (VanRullen et al., 2005).
To evaluate the contribution of neuronal adaptation, we measured the
duration of the static and Xicker motion aftereVects (MAE) induced by
our ring stimulus, in both conditions. Immediately after each 40 s trial, one
of the two half-rings disappeared (and was replaced by the gray back-
ground), while the other half-ring remained but stopped its rotation; the
observer was instructed to wait until any impression of (reversed) motion
was extinguished in this remaining half-ring, and then press a key to signal
the end of the aftereVect. In half of the trials (randomly determined), the
remaining half-ring was static, while in the other half it Xickered steadily at
10 Hz. The resulting durations represented a measure of the strength of the
“static” and “Xicker” MAE, respectively (Mather, Verstraten, & Anstis,
1998).
3. Results
To distinguish whether the continuous Wagon Wheel
Illusion (c-WWI) is location-based (Kline et al., 2004) or
object-based (VanRullen et al., 2005), we designed a motion
stimulus that would be perceived as one or two separate
objects –depending on a minor manipulation that did not
aVect (in a statistical sense) its low-level structure. We used
a ring stimulus, within which a radial grating was rotated at
a temporal frequency of 10 Hz, the optimal frequency to
generate the c-WWI (VanRullen et al., 2005; Simpson et al.,
2005). A vertical gray bar was superimposed on the screen,
hiding the midline of the ring stimulus. At the beginning of
each trial, we (pseudo-) randomly decided on the rotationdirection (clockwise or counterclockwise) for each half of
the ring stimulus independently. Therefore, half of the trials
had the two half-rings moving in compatible directions
(“congruent rotation” trials) and the rest of the trials had
the half-rings moving in opposite directions (“incongruent
rotation” trials). Although the local low-level properties of
the stimulus were statistically comparable in both cases, the
Gestalt principles of similarity, good continuation and
common fate (KoVka, 1935; Kohler, 1947) resulted in the
ring being perceived as a whole, united object in the former
case, but not in the latter1. Thus, location-based sampling
of motion information would predict that both trial types
should result in comparable amounts of c-WWI; object-
based sampling, on the other hand, would predict that con-
gruent rotation trials result in illusory reversals of the entire
ring, whereas incongruent trials should yield more indepen-
dent reversals in each half-ring. (Global sampling, Wnally,
would predict that the whole ring always reverses at once,
irrespective of the type of trial.)
As for other bistable eVects, we evaluated the strength of
the c-WWI as the percentage of the time spent reporting
reversed motion (Kline et al., 2004; VanRullen et al., 2005)
(Fig. 1a). As predicted by the object-based account, there
were signiWcantly more joint reversals of both half-rings in
the congruent than in the incongruent rotation trials
(paired t-test, t(6) D 2.92, p D .026), and more reversals of a
single half-ring in the incongruent than in the congruent
rotation trials (t(6) D 6.43, p < .001 for the left half-ring,
t(6) D 5.72, p < .002 for the right half-ring). Note that, as
pointed out by Kline, Holcombe and Eagleman (Kline
et al., 2004), the fact that many reversals were restricted to a
single half-ring (in particular, during the incongruent trials)
rules out global sampling of the visual Weld.
We also compared the amount of joint reversals in each
condition with the amount that would be predicted if each
half-ring reversed independently (which was calculated by
multiplying the total proportion of reversals obtained for
each half-ring). The actual amount of joint reversals was
signiWcantly higher than this predicted number in the con-
gruent trials (t(6) D 3.47, p < .02), and lower than this pre-
diction for the incongruent trials (although the eVect did
not reach signiWcance, t(6) D 1.65, p > .05). Thus, the per-
ceived unity of the two half-rings in the congruent condi-
tion resulted in a strong tendency of the c-WWI to
encompass both half-rings. In other words, the c-WWI
aVected the entire ring when it was perceived as a single
entity, and each half independently when they were
1 In a separate control experiment, we veriWed that observers do tend to
perceive congruent and incongruent rotating rings as containing 1 vs. 2
separate “objects”, respectively. We presented each stimulus type (in coun-
terbalanced order across observers) for an unlimited duration to 10 ob-
servers (Wve of which had participated in at least one of our experiments)
and asked them “Do you see one moving object, two moving objects, or is
it too ambiguous to tell?”. All observers reported seeing one moving object
for congruent rotation and two objects during incongruent rotation.
Readers can experience these stimuli online at: http://www.klab.
caltech.edu/~ruWn/ringmovies/.
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eVect is object-based.
Since motion adaptation is likely to play a role in the
c-WWI (e.g., by tipping oV the perceptual balance in favor
of the illusory motion direction), we veriWed that the strong
qualitative change in perceptual appearance between con-
gruent and incongruent trials was not due to a diVerence in
the absolute amount of motion adaptation. To this end, we
measured the duration of the “static” and “Xicker” motion
aftereVects (MAE) induced by our ring stimulus, in both
conditions (Mather et al., 1998). Both measures character-
ize the amount of neuronal adaptation to a motion stimu-
lus, but the Xicker MAE is generally thought to provide a
more sensitive measure and/or to tap into a higher-order
motion system (Ledgeway, 1994; Nishida & Sato, 1995;
Culham, Verstraten, Ashida, & Cavanagh, 2000). For both
types of MAE, the obtained durations did not diVer sensi-
bly between congruent and incongruent rotation trials. The
average (§standard error) static MAE duration was 4.48 s
(§1.13 s) for congruent trials and 4.77 s (§1.20 s) for incon-
gruent trials (t(6) D 0.18, p > .05). The average Xicker MAE
duration was 5.08 s (§1.09 s) for congruent trials and 4.62 s
(§1.05 s) for incongruent trials (t(6) D 0.30, p > .05). Thus,
the absolute level of motion adaptation does not depend on
whether the ring is perceived as a united object or not, and
is unlikely to explain our Wnding that the c-WWI is object-
based.Our results so far indicate that the perceived direction
of motion in one hemiWeld is heavily inXuenced by the
rotation direction in the other hemiWeld. We wondered
whether this eVect could be explained by the heavy neural
circuitry involved in spatially linking visual attributes that
straddle the vertical meridian and thus project in distinct
brain hemispheres (Gazzaniga, 1995). To explore this pos-
sibility, we repeated the entire experiment, but with the
entire stimulus rotated by 90° (Fig. 2a). Now interactions
between the two half-rings could take place within each
cortical hemisphere rather than only across hemispheres.
Results were, however, essentially the same as before.
More joint reversals of the two halves occurred in the
congruent trials than in the incongruent trials (t(4) D 3.27,
p < .05), whereas more individual reversals of a single half-
ring occurred in the incongruent than in the congruent
trials (t(4) D 8.50, p D 0.001 for the top half-ring,
t(4) D 4.50, p < .02 for the bottom half-ring). During con-
gruent (respectively, incongruent) rotation there were also
more (respectively, less) joint reversals than would be pre-
dicted if the two halves reversed independently
(t(4) D 3.54, p < .05 for congruent rotation, t(4) D 2.95,
p < .05 for incongruent rotations). Finally, neither the
static nor the Xicker MAEs (Fig. 2b) diVered signiWcantly
in magnitude between congruent and incongruent trials
(t(4) D 0.13, p > .05 and t(4) D 0.73, p > .05 respectively).
Overall, there was thus no evidence that inter-hemisphericFig. 1. (a) The ring stimulus was viewed for 40 s at a time, during which subjects (n D 7) continuously reported which of the two halves momentarily
appeared to reverse its motion direction, i.e. to undergo a c-WWI. When rotation in the two half-rings was congruent (i.e. both clockwise or both counter-
clockwise), most perceptual reversals encompassed both half-rings (open bars). The amount of joint reversals was higher in this case (p < .02) than would
be predicted if the two halves reversed independently (dashed line). On the other hand, when the two half-rings rotated incongruently, most reversals were
restricted to one or the other half (black bars). The amount of joint reversals in this case was signiWcantly lower (p < .05) than in the previous case. (b) We
veriWed that the congruency of the ring stimulus did not directly inXuence neuronal adaptation to the motion stimulus. At the end of each 40 s trial, one of
the two halves disappeared and the subjects estimated the duration of the motion aftereVect (MAE) for the half-ring that remained on the screen, which
could be either static (static MAE, left), or Xickering steadily at 10 Hz (Xicker MAE, right). In both cases, the duration of the MAE (reXecting the amount
of adaptation) did not depend on whether the ring was congruent or not (p > 0.05). Error bars represent s.e.m.
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object-based inXuences on the c-WWI eVect.
4. Discussion
What is an object? Can we be conWdent that the reports
of our observers reXect perceived “objecthood” rather than
merely a high-level response bias? As pointed out by David
Marr (Marr, 1982), objects are an elusive concept in vision
science:
“Is a nose an object? Is a head one? Is it still one if it is
attached to a body? What about a man on horseback?
These questions show that the diYculties in trying to for-
mulate what should be recovered as a region from an
image are so great as to amount almost to philosophical
problems. There is really no answer to them—all these
things can be an object if you want to think of them that
way, or they can be part of a larger object.” (p. 270).
Indeed, decades of investigation in the Gestalt tradition
(KoVka, 1935; Kohler, 1947) have only started to reveal
what features tend to group together, and under what con-
ditions, to produce perceived “objects”. In a more prag-
matic way—and even though this merely displaces our
deWnition problem—the notion of object is intimately
linked to the concept of attention, as suggested in the
famous quote from William James (James, 1890):
“Every one knows what attention is. It is the taking
possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one outof what seem several simultaneously possible objects [ƒ]”
(p 403).
Without committing to a precise deWnition which would
inevitably be too restrictive, we can thus simply consider
that “everyone knows what an object is”, and that whatever
our observers individuated as “objects” during the experi-
ments should probably be regarded as such.
With this in mind, our results indicate that the continu-
ous Wagon Wheel Illusion is a high-level eVect, whose spa-
tial extent is entirely determined by the global perceptual
organization of the scene into objects. This implies that the
illusion cannot be explained simply in terms of the proper-
ties of individual motion detectors in early cortical areas.
Together with a previous report of a strong attentional
inXuence on the c-WWI (VanRullen et al., 2005), these Wnd-
ings imply that the illusion may reXect the periodic opera-
tion of attention. According to our calculations (VanRullen
et al., 2005), and to our recent experimental conWrmation
using EEG (VanRullen, Reddy, & Koch, 2006), the “rate”
of this periodic attentional capture of motion information
would lie around 13 Hz.
Both our account and the opposing view of this illusion
championed by Kline and colleagues (Kline et al., 2004,
2006), agree on the bistable nature of the eVect: a (rela-
tively weak) signal supporting illusory motion must be
rivalling with the veridical motion signal to induce the
occasional perceptual reversals. One major point of dis-
agreement between the two camps is on the origin of these
signals supporting the non-veridical direction of motion:Fig. 2. (a) When the entire display was rotated by 90°, the motion information from the two half-rings could interact not only across but also within corti-
cal hemispheres. Results (n D 5) were similar to the previous case: during congruent rotation there was an increased tendency to perceive illusory motion
reversals of both half-rings together (open bars); during incongruent rotation, on the other hand, most reversals were restricted to a single half (black
bars). (b) The amount of neuronal adaptation, measured by the static or the Xicker MAE, did not diVer signiWcantly between the congruent and incongru-
ent rotation trials (p > .05). Error bars represent s.e.m.
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our view, motion adaptation (and/or Reichardt motion
detector aliasing) according to Kline and colleagues
(Kline et al., 2004, 2006). While the present experiment
does not in itself provide deWnitive evidence for our view,
it restrains the range of adaptation-based models that
could account for the illusion. In particular, our data
could not be explained by the speciWc adaptation of high-
level, rotation-sensitive neurons (Sakata et al., 1994), since
we measured no stronger motion aftereVect in the congru-
ent rotation trials than in the incongruent ones (Figs. 1b
and 2b). On the other hand, as mentioned above, adapta-
tion of low-level motion detectors (such as Reichardt-
based detectors) cannot easily account for our high-level
object-based eVects. Future work will hopefully disambig-
uate the relative contributions of discrete sampling vs.
motion adaptation to the continuous Wagon Wheel
Illusion.
During incongruent trials, the total amount of time
spent by our observers in a non-veridical percept (i.e., with
at least one half-ring reported in the illusory direction)
was about twice as high as during the congruent trials.
The congruent ring stimuli are similar to the conventional
“wheel” stimuli often used in studies of the c-WWI (Pur-
ves et al., 1996; VanRullen et al., 2005; Simpson et al.,
2005; VanRullen et al., 2006) (except for an empty disk in
the center). Why would the incongruent ring increase the
strength of the illusion compared to the more conven-
tional, congruent one? This can be understood by relating
the bistable motion percept of the c-WWI to a dynamic
system (Poston & Stewart, 1978; Richards, Wilson, &
Sommer, 1994). A congruent wheel or ring stimulus would
constitute a stable point for motion perception: it takes
considerable energy (i.e., long adaptation durations) to
venture away from this point. An incongruent ring such as
ours, on the other hand, can be considered a highly unsta-
ble point, because it cannot be bound into a single
“object” representation: less energy (i.e., shorter adapta-
tion durations) may be required to swing from this point
to a more stable motion percept—which is achieved when
a single half-ring reverses, resulting in a perceptually uni-
form object. Our procedure of introducing incongruent
motion between the two halves of the stimulus may thus
be a promising way to increase the strength of the c-WWI
in future experimental studies.
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